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Appellant Lucille T. Williams individually and as trustee for the Lucille T. 
Williams Trust ("Williams"), is a non-party who sought intervention in the trial court 
action pending before the Honorable Judge Sandra N. Peuler, Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Williams responds to the Brief of Appellees as follows: 
I. Williams' Motion to Intervene and Memorandum in Support Thereof Was 
Filed Timely. 
Williams filed her Motion to Intervene and Memorandum in Support thereof on 
October 30, 2002, after she became aware that the Order of trial Judge Sandra Peuler 
would affect her property rights as owner of the property at issue. Williams had not been 
made a party to the trial court action prior to that date (R. 479-486). During the time that 
the action was pending before the trial court Williams had an understanding that her 
husband was in a dispute with Appellee Cuma Hoopiiaina, however, she had no 
understanding of the details or substance of the proceedings and no understanding that the 
outcome may affect her rights as property owner. (R. 479-486). Williams' Motion to 
Intervene and Memorandum in Support thereof were filed prior to the signing of Findings 
of Fact by Judge Peuler on November 26, 2002 (R. 584-586, 588-613) and while the 
issues before this court regarding whether the proper parties were before the trial court 
were still being disputed. 
1 
II. Williams Had a Right to Intervene Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-7 and 
Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for a right of intervention upon 
"timely application." See, Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when a statute 
confers an unconditional right to intervene. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-34-7 provides, in pertinent part: 
All persons in occupation of, or having or claiming an interest in, 
any of the property described in the Complaint, or in the damage for 
the taking thereof, though not named, may appear, plead and defend, 
each in respect to his own property or interest, or that claimed by 
him, in the same manner as if named in the Complaint. § 78-34-7, 
UCA(1953). 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah Code annotated 
78-34-7, when an intervening party may establish a valid interest in property which is or 
will be affected by the determination in a pending case, the movant should be allowed to 
intervene. See, generally. State v. Tedesco, 4 Utah 31, 286 P.2d 785 (1955). 
Williams had an undisputed interest in the property in question as evidenced by the 
Deed conveying the property to her as Trustee for the Lucille T. Williams Trust. (R. 597-
613; 479-486). The action before the trial court had the potential to and the affect of 
impairing Lucille Williams' ability to protect her interest in the property. In Lima v. 
Chambers, 657 P.2d 279 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court 
should consider whether the intervening movant "is or may be bound by a judgment in the 
litigation" then liberally construe the application of Rule 24(a) in an effort to eliminate 
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unnecessary duplication of litigation. Id. at 282. The Utah Supreme Court has defined 
the nature of the interest necessary to permit intervention as follows: "[t]o justify 
intervention [as of right], the party seeking [it] must demonstrate a direct interest in the 
subject matter of the litigation such that the intervenor's rights may be affected, for good 
or for ill" Lima. 657 P.2d at 282. 
Appellee argues that Williams' Motion to Intervene was untimely because the 
action had been pending since December 5, 1995; however, Williams has established that 
she had not been made a party to the trial court action (R. 479-486). Further, during the 
time that the action was pending before the trial court Williams had an understanding that 
her husband was in a dispute with Appellee Cuma Hoopiiaina; however, she had no 
understanding of the details or substance of the proceedings and no understanding that the 
outcome may affect her rights as property owner. These issues were being handled 
exclusively by her husband and his attorney. (R. 479-486). 
In addition, Williams' Motion to Intervene and Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Intervene were filed prior to the signing of Findings of Fact by Judge Peuler on 
November 26, 2002 (R. 584-586, 588-613) and while the issues before this court were 
still being disputed. 
Appellees cite the case of Republic Ins. Group v. Doman, 774 P.2d 1130, 1131 
(Utah 1989) in which the court analyzed whether a timely application to intervene had 
been filed. In Republic Ins., the Utah Supreme Court cited Jenner v. Real Estate Services, 
659 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1983) in which the court stated that in determining if a timely 
application to intervene has been made, the court should consider the facts and 
circumstances of each particular case. Id. at 1073-4. In the Republic Ins. case, the Court 
denied the intervenor's request, finding that he had waited too long to attempt to 
intervene. The Republic Ins. case is clearly distinguishable as the party seeking to 
intervene in that action knew the action was pending prior to his attempt to intervene. Id. 
at 1131. Further, the party seeking to intervene stated that he believed his interests had 
been represented in the trial court action. Id. at 1131-2. The intervenor in the Republic 
Ins. case had also filed his Motion to Intervene after the pertinent facts contained in a 
pending motion for summary judgment had been deemed admitted. Id. at 1131-2. 
In the case before this court, it is undisputed that Williams knew there was 
litigation between her husband and Appellee but did not know that the outcome may 
affect her property rights. (R. 479-486). It is also undisputed that her rights and interests 
were not being represented by any attorneys or parties to the case before the trial court. 
(R. 479-486). Appellees have presented no evidence to controvert Williams' assertions 
on these two issues. The only assertion of Appellees is that a Warranty Deed was 
executed conveying the property to Williams as Trustee of the Lucille T. Williams Trust 
during the pendency of the litigation before the trial court, on July 12, 2001. (R. 479-
486). At no time was Williams individually, or as trustee, made a party to the trial court 
proceedings and at no time were her interests represented. Finally, unlike the factual 
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scenario in Republic Ins., there were issues and pleadings filed by all parties in the trial 
court action regarding the interests of Williams in the property and asserting that the 
proper parties were not before the court immediately prior to and at the time her Motion 
to Intervene was filed. In this case, the trial court did not issue Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law until November 26, 2002, after additional briefing regarding whether 
the proper parties were before the court had been filed by all parties. (R. 397-459; 499-
510). In Republic Ins., the facts which were the subject of the disputed summary 
judgment ruling were not an issue. 
Lucille Williams' position is directly addressed by the language of § 78-34-7 and 
she should have been allowed to intervene on that basis. 
III. Williams Should Have Been Allowed to Intervene Permissively Under Rule 
24(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Appellee does not counter Williams' argument that she should have been allowed 
to intervene permissively under Rule 24(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 24(b)(2) provides, in pertinent part: 
Permissive intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be 
permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers a 
conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or 
defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in 
common . . . . 
Lucille Williams' right to intervene under Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-7 is set forth 
above. With the issues involved in this litigation, the request for relief and this Court's 
ruling ordering the tearing down of the building on the Property, this action and any 
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subsequent action filed by Williams share common claims and defenses and have 
virtually identical questions of fact and law. Further, because of the irreversible damage 
which will be done in light of the relief ordered, i.e., tear down of the building located on 
the Property, it was fundamentally unfair to not permit Williams to intervene. If the 
Court's order (not yet complied with) is complied with and Williams is not allowed to 
intervene, irreparable damage will have been done with regard to the building. On this 
basis alone, her intervention should have been permitted. 
IV. Rule 25(c) Allows, and Does Not Prohibit Intervention of Williams in the 
Trial Court Proceeding by Filing of a Motion to Intervene. 
Appellees argue that the action against the property could have continued after 
transfer to Williams under Rule 25(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that 
the court may substitute the transferor or join the transferor in existing litigation involving 
transferred property upon motion and that such substitution is at the discretion of the trial 
court. Williams as a transferee of property sought such transfer or joinder through the 
Motion to Intervention and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene which she 
filed with the trial court. The provisions of Rule 25(c) do not prohibit or limit a party's 
ability to request to intervene via motion for intervention. Rule 25(c) does not specify 
what type of motion must be filed but merely states that parties may be added or 
substituted "upon motion" if allowed by the trial court. Had the trial court granted 
Williams' Motion to Intervene, she would have been substituted or added by the court 
"upon motion" as allowed by Rule 25(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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V. Williams Complied with Rule 24(c) by Filing a "Pleading". 
Appellees argue that Williams failed to file a motion with a pleading setting forth 
the grounds for the motion and claim or defense for which intervention is sought as 
required by Rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This assertion is false. Williams 
filed with the trial court, on October 30, 2002, two pleadings, a Motion to Intervene and a 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene. (R. 584-586, 588-613). Further, such 
pleadings were "served" on the parties to the trial court action by mailing a copy to their 
attorneys as provided in Rule 5(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
VI. Williams Intervention Is Not Barred by Collateral Estoppel or Issue 
Preclusion. 
Appellees argue that Williams' claims are barred by collateral estoppel or issue 
preclusion. Although M[i]t is well settled that issue preclusion prevents relitigation of the 
same issue even if the claims for relief in the two actions are different." Sevy v. Security 
Title Co. of S.Utah. 902 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah 1995), this doctrine is inappplicableto a 
party with a statutory right to intervene. In the case at bar, Appellant's statutory rights to 
intervene may not be abridged. 
The only case cited by Appellees in support of their position is Macris & 
Associates, Inc. v. Newavs. Inc.. 16 P.3d 1214 (Utah 2000). Macris is distinguishable 
from the case before this Court. In Macris a marketing company brought an action 
against a successor company for fraudulent transfer, successor liability and alter ego. The 
intervenor in that case sought to assert additional claims for contract damages which were 
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not litigated before the trial court. The Utah Supreme Court discussed both claim 
preclusion and issue preclusion, stating: 
In order for claim preclusion to bar a subsequent cause of action a 
plaintiff must satisfy three requirements: First, both cases must involve the 
same parties or their privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred 
must have been presented in the first suit or must be one that could and 
should have been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit must have 
resulted in a judgment on the merits. Macris at 1219, citing Madsen v. 
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). 
Under the elements of claim preclusion set forth in the Macris case, the doctrine 
cannot apply to this case. The first element cannot be met. Williams was not a party to 
the first action and, as set forth above, she has presented uncontroverted evidence that the 
parties to the litigation before the trial court were not her privies. Second, Appellees 
cannot establish that Williams' claims or defenses were the same as those asserted by 
others before the trial court because such claims and defenses have not been developed 
due to her inability to participate in the trial court action. 
In Macris, the court stated that a four part test is applied for purposes of issue 
preclusion: 
First, the issue challenged must be identical in the previous action and the 
case at hand. Second, the issue must have been decided in a final judgment 
on the merits in the previous action. Third, the issues must have been 
competently, fully and fairly litigated in the previous action. Fourth, the 
party against whom collateral estoppel is invoked in the current action must 
have been either a party or privy to a party in the previous action. Macris at 
1222 citing Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 934 P.2d 
1366, 1370 (Utah 1996). 
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Appellees cannot meet the elements necessary for issue preclusion. Again, as 
discussed in the context of claims preclusion, the party against whom the doctrine is being 
invoked was not a party to or privy to a party in the previous action. Further, the issues 
were not fully and fairly litigated because Williams was not allowed to present any 
evidence and was not represented by an attorney in the action before the trial court. The 
very briefs filed by the parties after trial in this matter address the fact that the issues were 
not fully and fairly litigated before the trial court because the property owner was not a 
party to the litigation. (R. 304-366; 397-459). Further, no party has disputed that 
Williams was not at all involved in the litigation before the trial court and no party has 
established that her interests were addressed and protected as they would have been had 
she been a party. 
As set forth above, Williams had a right to intervene in the trial court action. She 
was not allowed to intervene and was never a party. There is no assertion that her 
interests were, in fact, represented or defenses asserted on her behalf by any parties to the 
litigation. Her interests were not protected. The case before the trial court was not fully, 
fairly and competently litigated with the primary missing party being the owner of the 
property which is the subject of the action. The elements of issue preclusion and claims 
preclusion have not been met. 
Finally, Appellees state that they "only claim damages against J. Richard Williams 
who readily admitted that he was the occupant of the servient property for over 25 years 
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and he alone obstructed the use of the easement by the plaintiffs." The fact is, however, 
that the Amended Judgment and Decree issued by Judge Peuler affects the use and 
enjoyment of the property by requiring removal of a building on the property and 
"permanently enjoining" the property owner, not even a party to the litigation, "from 
obstructing or interfering with Plaintiffs' use of the right of way." (R. 658-661). The 
Amended Judgment and Decree of the trial court is not a matter of money damages being 
sought against one of the existing defendants. The court's order directly impacts the use 
and enjoyment of the property and the rights of Williams. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Appellant Williams requests that this Court 
remand this matter to the trial court. 
DATED t h i s ^ p ^ a y of August, 2004. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
iael R/Carlstof 
Dunyon 
Attorneys for Appellant Lucille Williams. 
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